Wading Through Treacle: Drones vs Mass in the Ukraine War
AI Analysis
The Ukraine war has seen a massive increase in drone usage, with both Ukraine and Russia deploying millions of drones annually. FPV drones have become crucial in combat, serving as cost-effective precision artillery, while electronic warfare has made large drones vulnerable.
Key Takeaways
- Ukraine and Russia are flying millions of drones annually by 2025.
- FPV drones are used as precision artillery, with high consumption rates.
- Large drones have become vulnerable due to advanced air defense and electronic warfare.
- Electronic warfare capabilities have expanded, making simple drones fragile.
- Long-range drones and missiles have targeted Russian energy infrastructure.
Why It Matters
The extensive use of drones has created a new dimension in warfare, challenging traditional military strategies and emphasizing the importance of electronic warfare. This shift highlights the need for advanced counter-UAS systems and could influence global military procurement and policy decisions.
Wading Through Treacle: Drones vs Mass in the Ukraine War
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A Russian tank taken out by a jury-rigged FPV (First-Person View) quadcopter; an oil refinery 1,500 kilometres from the front burning because of a composite airframe the size of a bicycle. Those images are no longer novelties but the grammar of the war. By late 2025, Ukraine and Russia are flying millions of drones a year; up to three-quarters of equipment losses on both sides are now drone-related.
The question has sharpened: can Ukraine, with fewer people and less steel, use drones plus Western supply to bend the attrition curve far enough to offset Russia’s larger economy and mobilisation base? The sober answer is that drones have created a second front and prevented defeat, but they have not abolished mass. Whether they deliver victory depends on three equations: tactical kill chains, industrial cadence, and political will.
What has changed since the “first wave”
In 2023–24, FPV drones were an improvisation feeding into a static line: GoPros on quadcopters, artisanal bombs, Telegram fundraisers. That phase is over. By 2025, Ukraine alone is expected to produce more than 4.5 million UAVs of various classes, over two million of them FPVs. Russia has industrialised its own production, importing components from Asia and building domestic lines. Both sides now field drone “armies” as an integral part of brigades, not as exotic adjuncts.
Several other trends matter.
– Large, high-altitude drones have largely disappeared over the front; air defence and EW made them too vulnerable. The battlefield is dominated by cheap, low-flying, expendable systems. – Electronic warfare has scaled on both sides: jamming, spoofing and direction-finding make simple radio-linked drones increasingly fragile. – Long-range one-way drones and cruise missiles have turned the Russian rear, especially the energy sector, into a battleground: Ukraine has hit at least 21 of Russia’s major refineries since early 2024, in some months knocking 15–20% of refining capacity offline, even if Moscow has often compensated by rerouting flows.
Yet the map is largely static. As of late 2025 the front is a brutal stalemate of trenches, mines, artillery and drones; Russia has clawed forward in some sectors by concentrating glide bombs and infantry, but the broad line moves slowly, if at all.
- FPVs: the new small-unit artillery
FPV drones have become the poor man’s precision artillery. A good operator can put a shaped charge into a dugout, a vehicle vision slit or a gun emplacement at a fraction of the cost of a guided shell. Ukrainian and Russian brigades now consume hundreds of FPVs per month; their real requirement is in the thousands.
Their effect is threefold.
– They turn movement into risk. Any exposed vehicle, logistics run or small assault group can be hunted in near real time. – They substitute for shells at the margin, though