The future of NATO's deterrence in the air domain - Atlantic Council
AI Analysis
This Atlantic Council report assesses the challenges facing NATO airpower as the US shifts focus to the Indo-Pacific, highlighting a growing dependence on US enabling capabilities. The report stresses the need for European allies to prioritize resilient command and control (C2), ISR, airbase protection, and investment in autonomous/attritable systems to maintain credible deterrence against Russia. A key concern is the anticipated use of missile and drone strikes against critical infrastructure in any future conflict.
Key Takeaways
- NATO faces a strategic shift with reduced expected US airpower support in Europe.
- Russia is identified as the primary adversary, with a likely strategy of initial strikes against critical infrastructure (airbases, logistics, C2).
- European allies must focus on mitigating capability gaps in C2 and ISR in the short-term, while building capacity for long-term independence.
- Prioritization of resilient C2 networks, deeper stockpiles, stronger airbase resilience, and autonomous/attritable systems is crucial.
- The concept of 'strategic simultaneity' – multiple threats occurring concurrently – adds complexity to NATO’s air defense requirements.
Why It Matters
The report underscores a critical vulnerability in NATO’s current posture: over-reliance on US assets. Failure to address these capability gaps could weaken deterrence and increase risk in the event of conflict with Russia, particularly given the anticipated use of drones and missiles against key infrastructure. This necessitates accelerated investment and strategic realignment within European NATO members.
The future of NATO's deterrence in the air domain - Atlantic Council
Bottom lines up front
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- NATO’s European allies must determine how to carry out the Alliance’s mission with reduced US military support as Washington shifts resources toward the Indo-Pacific.
- NATO airpower remains heavily dependent on US enabling capabilities.
- To preserve credible deterrence, allies must prioritize resilient C2 networks, deeper stockpiles, stronger airbase resilience, and autonomous and attritable systems.
Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is in the midst of a dramatic transformation. European allies must determine how to provide collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security assuming reduced military support from the United States as US resources shift to the Indo-Pacific. This concern is especially acute in the air domain. European allied air forces need to compensate for reduced US airpower availability while ensuring sufficient resilience to continue operating in a contested environment. Achieving this feat at the necessary scale to deter NATO’s main adversary—Russia—while also mitigating other threats to NATO necessitates European allied air forces assessing capability gaps based on the operational problems they need to solve in both peacetime and wartime, then managing the resultant risks over time. This report addresses a central question: What capabilities must European NATO airpower possess—independently or with only limited US operational support—to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression in the near to medium term?
To answer that question, this report identifies the problems NATO airpower must solve, the gaps that stem from reduced US support, and risk management recommendations for the short and medium terms. In general, allied air forces should mitigate capability gaps in the short term, especially for critical capabilities such as command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), through “good enough” solutions, while laying the foundation for closing those gaps in the medium term through investments that build capacity across Europe.
The environment
Credible recommendations for European allied airpower must be grounded in strategic context. The Alliance’s strategic environment is characterized by three key constraints that shape its needs from airpower. These factors—Russia’s military posture, the growing likelihood of strategic simultaneity, and the evolving role of the United States as an enabling partner—shape the operational problems NATO air forces must be prepared to address.
Russia and other threats
These scenarios place particular pressure on NATO’s defensive posture. Sustained missile and drone strikes against infrastructure—including air bases, logistics hubs, energy networks, and C2 nodes—are likely in the early stages of conflict. The number of assets identified on NATO and national Critical Asset Lists (CALs) will