Towards a Layered Denial Strategy: Lessons from the Black Sea for Taiwan - Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
AI Analysis
This report analyzes the potential for Taiwan to adopt a layered denial strategy, mirroring Ukraine's successful use of Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs) in the Black Sea against the Russian Navy. The strategy focuses on utilizing low-cost, adaptable, and networked USVs to disrupt a potential Chinese naval blockade or invasion of Taiwan. The report highlights the importance of asymmetric warfare tactics in countering a conventionally superior force.
Key Takeaways
- The PLA Navy (PLAN) is central to China's potential strategies for Taiwan, including invasion, quarantine, and blockade.
- Ukraine's use of USVs demonstrated the ability to challenge a superior navy, disrupt blockade attempts, and reshape the maritime battlespace at a relatively low cost.
- Taiwan should integrate USVs into a broader layered defense system encompassing surveillance, strike, and denial capabilities.
- A layered denial strategy aims to restrict PLAN maneuverability, complicate invasion/blockade plans, and increase operational costs for China.
- The report identifies three plausible Chinese scenarios: direct invasion, limited maritime quarantine, and full naval blockade.
Why It Matters
This analysis suggests a viable, asymmetric defense approach for Taiwan against a more powerful Chinese military. The successful application of USVs in Ukraine provides a real-world case study for Taiwan's defense planning, potentially influencing procurement and strategy. This could significantly alter the cost-benefit calculation for China regarding any potential action against Taiwan.
Towards a Layered Denial Strategy: Lessons from the Black Sea for Taiwan - Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
Towards a Layered Denial Strategy: Lessons from the Black Sea for Taiwan
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June 2, 2026
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Abstract: This article examines how lessons from Ukraine’s use of uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) in the Black Sea can inform Taiwan’s asymmetric maritime defense against potential Chinese coercion. It outlines three plausible scenarios for Chinese action against Taiwan: direct invasion, limited maritime quarantine, and full naval blockade, highlighting the central role of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). It then analyses Ukraine’s employment of maritime drones against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, showing how low-cost, adaptable, and networked systems challenged a conventionally superior navy, disrupted blockade efforts, and reshaped the maritime battlespace. Building on this comparison, the article argues that Taiwan should integrate USVs into a broader layered denial strategy designed to deny the PLAN freedom of maneuver, complicate blockade enforcement, raise the costs of amphibious operations, and buy time for allied intervention. Despite key differences between the Black Sea and the Taiwan Strait, maritime drones could become a critical element of Taiwan’s future deterrence posture.
Summary: This article argues that the main lesson from Ukraine’s use of maritime drones in the Black Sea is the viability of a layered denial strategy for Taiwan. By analyzing how uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) helped Ukraine challenge Russian naval superiority, disrupt blockade efforts, and reshape the maritime battlespace, the article assesses their relevance for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. It concludes that Taiwan should integrate USVs into a broader asymmetric defense architecture combining surveillance, strike, and denial capabilities. Such a layered denial strategy could restrict the PLA Navy’s freedom of maneuver, complicate blockade or invasion plans, raise operational costs, and buy time for allied support.
Key words: Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs), Taiwan, Ukraine, Asymmetric Warfare, BlackSea
Introduction
Tensions are on the rise in the South China Sea. China has long set its sights on eventual control of the island of Taiwan, making it a foremost strategic goal of the current century. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has developed various concepts for achieving this, aligning political guidelines with practical steps and capabilities to meet the expectations and timelines of the Chinese leadership under President Xi. This article will specifically focus on the role of the Chinese Navy (PLAN) in pressuring Taiwan toward reunification. Yet, thousands of miles east of Taiwan, new developments and technologies could provide viable means to prevent the execution of Chinese strategic planning. Since 2022, Russian aggression in Ukraine has long taken to the maritime d