Distributed Combat Power: How Ukraine is Redefining Fires, Electronic Warfare, and Air Defense at the Tactical Level - League of Ukrainian Canadians
AI Analysis
The war in Ukraine demonstrates a shift towards decentralized combat power, with Ukrainian forces effectively employing low-cost, adaptable systems for EW, cUAS, and fires at the battalion, platoon, and squad levels. A small Ukrainian drone team recently neutralized two NATO battalions (including US forces) during the Hedgehog 2025 exercise, highlighting the effectiveness of this approach. This contrasts with the traditionally centralized model of the U.S. Army.
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces are decentralizing EW, cUAS, and fires capabilities to lower echelons.
- Low-cost, rapidly adaptable systems are key to Ukraine's tactical success.
- Ukrainian drone operators rendered two NATO battalions combat ineffective during Exercise Hedgehog 2025.
- The U.S. Army’s centralized command structure may be a disadvantage in a contested environment.
- Ukraine's success is attributed to both technological adaptation and a cultural shift towards entrepreneurial junior leadership.
Why It Matters
This trend suggests a potential vulnerability in traditional, technologically superior forces against adversaries utilizing decentralized, low-cost drone warfare tactics. The U.S. Army needs to re-evaluate its command structure and invest in equipping lower echelons with cUAS and EW capabilities to maintain a competitive edge in future conflicts. This highlights the growing importance of asymmetric warfare and the need for adaptability.
Distributed Combat Power: How Ukraine is Redefining Fires, Electronic Warfare, and Air Defense at the Tactical Level - League of Ukrainian Canadians
Distributed Combat Power: How Ukraine is Redefining Fires, Electronic Warfare, and Air Defense at the Tactical Level
by Daine van de Wall
Small Wars Journal
05.21.2026
The war in Ukraine reveals a fundamental shift in how combat power is generated at the tactical level. The proliferation of cheap, rapidly adaptable systems has enabled a profound decentralization of leadership and responsibilities across fires, electronic warfare, and air defense. In contrast, U.S. Army formations, shaped by decades of operational dominance, retain a comparatively centralized model that may leave them ill-prepared for the demands of a persistently contested environment. This article examines Ukrainian adaptations—both technological and cultural—across three warfighting functions and draws lessons for the U.S. Army.
Introduction
The U.S. Army fields some of the most technologically advanced infantry brigades in the world. These formations possess an extensive array of capabilities, including encrypted communications, precision fires, protected mobility platforms, and access to national-level intelligence reachback. Platform for platform, few adversaries can match the sophistication of these systems. Moreover, the U.S. Army’s rigorous training cycles and professional military education system ensure that brigades are manned by tactically proficient soldiers.
Yet the war in Ukraine suggests a growing asymmetry in how tactical effectiveness is generated. Ukrainian brigades—operating under persistent unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) surveillance, continuous electronic warfare (EW), degraded GPS and communications, and constant artillery and drone threats—have adapted inexpensive, rapidly modifiable systems to solve complex tactical problems. These platforms have been distributed far and wide, resulting in a profound decentralization of leadership and responsibility across warfighting functions. From the agricultural fields of the Donbas to the urban strongholds of Kharkiv, Ukrainian forces at the battalion, platoon, and squad level actively manage and conduct EW, counter-unmanned aerial systems (cUAS), and execute their own kill chains.
The recent Hedgehog 2025 exercise in Estonia illustrates the lethality of this combination of ubiquitous, low-cost technology and entrepreneurial junior leadership. During the multinational exercise involving over 16,000 troops from 12 NATO countries, a small team of roughly ten Ukrainian drone operators—acting as the opposing force—rendered two NATO battalions, including U.S. forces, combat ineffective.
U.S. formations remain the most lethal in the world. However, the Ukrainian battlefield demonstrates how the proliferation of low-cost systems has enabled the decentralization of combat power to the lowest levels. As these technologies have become more accessible, tasks associated