Who has authority to deal with drones? In most of Europe, that’s unclear | The Strategist
AI Analysis
A new report highlights a critical governance gap in Europe's counter-UAS capabilities: existing technology is hampered by a lack of clear legal authority and jurisdictional coordination for rapid response. Drone-related disruptions are rapidly increasing, particularly at critical infrastructure like airports, with response times exceeding legal authorization timelines. Poland is noted as an exception, having adopted an effects-based jurisdiction model.
Key Takeaways
- Most European countries lack clear legal frameworks for deploying counter-UAS technology, hindering effective response to drone threats.
- Response times to drone detections are often under 5 minutes, but legal authorization for countermeasures is frequently delayed.
- Structural fragmentation exists within nations (e.g., UK, Germany) with overlapping authorities and complex approval processes for electronic countermeasures.
- Drone disruptions at European airports tripled between January 2024 and November 2025, causing significant economic costs.
- A harmonized European framework with clear jurisdictional authority and neutralisation thresholds is proposed to address the escalating threat.
Why It Matters
The inability to rapidly and legally counter drone threats leaves European critical infrastructure vulnerable to disruption and attack. This governance gap presents a significant strategic weakness that adversaries could exploit, potentially causing widespread economic damage and eroding public confidence. A unified European approach is crucial to mitigating this risk and ensuring effective defense against evolving drone warfare tactics.
Who has authority to deal with drones? In most of Europe, that’s unclear | The Strategist
Author: James Reeves Published: 2026-05-25T20:00:19+00:00 Source: aspistrategist.org.au (aspistrategist.org.au) Language: en
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Who has authority to deal with drones? In most of Europe, that’s unclear | The Strategist
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Europe’s growing drone problem is a governance problem. The hardware exists. What is missing, across most of the continent, is the legal authority to deploy it, the jurisdictional clarity to coordinate it, and the political will to mandate either.
Until that changes, Europe’s critical infrastructure will remain exposed to attacks that are cheap to mount and catastrophically expensive to absorb.
This conclusion comes from primary research: a strategic intelligence briefing on governance of uncrewed aerial systems (UASs, or drones). This was conducted by Challenger Research in partnership with policy consultancy TWA, drawing on 23 stakeholder interviews across politicians, defence experts, strategic advisors and critical infrastructure professionals in Britain and Europe, alongside regulatory analysis of Britain, Poland, Germany and Italy. The findings have been consistent across every jurisdiction examined. Legal authority and jurisdictional fragmentation are fundamental constraints on effective counter-drone response. The available counter-UAS hardware cannot be lawfully deployed fast enough to matter in the few minutes between identification and response.
The scale of the problem is accelerating. Drone-related disruptions at European airports more than tripled between January 2024 and November 2025. Our research has found that the interval between detection and disruption at an airport is less than five minutes, yet few airports hold the legal authority to act on what they have detected. Runway closures, as seen in Copenhagen and Oslo last year, are enormously costly in flight cancellations. Across ports, energy networks and data infrastructure, critical national infrastructure operators can detect hostile UAS activity but are legally barred from taking active countermeasures. As one industry stakeholder put it plainly, ‘Rules of engagement are the primary issue. There is no ownership of responsibility.’
The drone’s strategic value has little to do with its physical payload. It is a tool for sowing confusion, eroding public confidence and forcing expensive defensive reactions from a cheaper offensive position. Russia only needs success in one EU country to land a blow felt across the entire bloc.
Our research has uncovered structural fragmentation. In Britain, the Civil Aviation Authority regulates civil UASs, police hold operational authority under the Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021, and the Ministry of Defence’s jurisdiction is largely confined to its own estate. Electronic countermeasures require senior-level authorisation as well as approval from telecommunications regulators. Germany opened