Ukraine’s Intermediate-Range Strike Campaign | ISW
AI Analysis
Ukraine is shifting from a positional war to one incorporating tactical maneuver, enabled by a regained drone advantage and deep strike capabilities. The battlefield is characterized by a 'kill zone' extending 15-25km from the frontline due to drone saturation, hindering massed formations. Russia has adapted by utilizing small-scale infiltration tactics.
Key Takeaways
- Ukraine has re-established a drone advantage, allowing disruption of Russian forces throughout their operational depth.
- The 'kill zone' created by drone saturation forces force dispersion and prevents large-scale offensives within 30km of the front.
- Russian offensive maneuvers are now primarily limited to small-scale infiltration tactics.
- Ukraine's current initiative presents a time-constrained opportunity to exploit Russian vulnerabilities.
- Neither side is currently capable of operational maneuver, but Ukraine's limited mechanized attacks suggest a potential shift.
Why It Matters
This shift indicates a potential turning point in the conflict, with Ukraine attempting to break the stalemate. The dominance of drones highlights the increasing importance of counter-UAS technologies and electronic warfare capabilities. Continued support for Ukraine’s drone capabilities is crucial for sustaining this initiative.
Ukraine’s Intermediate-Range Strike Campaign | ISW
Contemporary & Future WarRussia & Ukraine
Ukraine
Studies in Contemporary War
Ukraine’s Intermediate-Range Strike Campaign and New Mechanized Attacks Herald the Start of a New Phase of the War
May 25, 2026
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Ukraine’s Intermediate-Range Strike Campaign and New Mechanized Attacks Herald the Start of a New Phase of the War
Ukraine is actively challenging the positional character of the war that has dominated the battlefield since 2023. Russian battlefield gains are approaching net zero, while Ukrainian forces are setting conditions potentially to break out of positional warfare by reintroducing limited elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level. Ukraine has re-secured an overall drone advantage and fielded systems capable of disrupting Russian forces throughout their operational depth in support of planned Ukrainian offensive or defensive ground operations. Neither Russia nor Ukraine can conduct operational maneuvers yet, however. Ukraine’s success in blunting Russian advances and reversing Russian gains in some sectors of the line, in tandem with Ukraine’s limited reintroduction of elements of tactical mechanized maneuver, may nevertheless mark the beginning of a new phase of the war. Combat in Ukraine will likely become less positional and feature more tactical maneuver until Russia’s innovation cycle renders Ukraine’s current operational concepts ineffective. Ukraine likely has a unique and time-constrained opportunity to exploit its current initiative while Russian forces remain vulnerable. Ukraine’s partners should expand their support to these Ukrainian efforts at a moment when Russia is reeling from both battlefield setbacks and Ukraine’s deep strike campaign with the aim of forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his approach to this conflict.
The character of the war has been of a positional nature since late 2023, with neither side being capable of conducting operational maneuver. The partially transparent drone-dominated battlefield has forced belligerents to disperse their forces within the kill zone — the expanding area (currently within 15-25 kilometers from the frontline) where the saturation of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones poses an elevated risk to any personnel or equipment operating within.[1] Neither Russia nor Ukraine has been able to mass infantry or heavy equipment within 30 kilometers of the frontline necessary to achieve operational breakthroughs, though Russian forces have attempted occasional abortive battalion-, company-, and platoon-sized mechanized assaults over the years.[2] Russian forces’ main form of offensive maneuver since 2025 has been infiltration, usually conducted by small groups of one to three infantrymen who attempt to use cover, concealment, and subterranean infrastructure to infiltrate the kill zone and into the tactical rear of Ukrainian positions.[3] These Russian infiltrators attempt t