Cheap Missiles, Not Drones, Will Win the Next Air War
AI Analysis
The article argues that the battlefield in Ukraine demonstrates a shift away from drone dominance towards the effectiveness of faster, missile-like drones and low-cost missiles for both offense and defense. Russia is adapting Shahed drones with turbojet engines, outpacing slower propeller-driven interceptors, while Iran has developed a cost-effective missile (358) capable of engaging a wide range of aerial targets. Western defense strategies are criticized for continuing to prioritize propeller-based drones despite these developments.
Key Takeaways
- Russia is modifying Shahed drones with turbojet engines, increasing speed to 460 mph and altitude to 29,000 ft, exceeding the capabilities of Ukrainian interceptor drones.
- Ukraine's propeller-driven interceptor drones are becoming less effective, forced to adopt less efficient head-on interception tactics.
- Iran's '358' missile is a $90,000 counter-drone system capable of intercepting a broad spectrum of aerial threats, including advanced platforms like the MQ-9 Reaper and AH-64 Apache.
- Western defense establishments are perceived as over-investing in propeller-based drones despite their limitations.
- The future of air warfare may hinge on the scalability of turbojet drones and solid-fuel missiles, alongside the maturation of laser-based defense systems.
Why It Matters
This analysis suggests a potential paradigm shift in air defense and drone warfare, highlighting the vulnerability of current Western strategies focused on slower, propeller-driven systems. The success of low-cost, high-speed drones and missiles could necessitate a re-evaluation of defense procurement and counter-UAS tactics, potentially requiring increased investment in faster interceptors and directed energy weapons. Ignoring these developments could lead to a significant disadvantage in future conflicts.
Cheap Missiles, Not Drones, Will Win the Next Air War
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Cheap Missiles, Not Drones, Will Win the Next Air War
May 4, 2026
Cogs of War
Cheap Missiles, Not Drones, Will Win the Next Air War
Vitaliy Goncharuk
May 4, 2026
After four years of watching the war in Ukraine, NATO defense decision-makers are finally beginning to pour money into drones. The Iran conflict has drawn further attention to these investments. The assumption is that unmanned aerial systems will ensure a long-term advantage in conflicts requiring ground operations and infrastructure defense.
But the battlefield in Ukraine is already pointing toward a different future. Russia is transforming slow, propeller-driven Shahed drones into cheap, missile-like systems by equipping them with turbojet engines. This has sharply complicated Ukrainian air defense, as the new platforms now fly two to three times faster (about 460 miles per hour, compared to 90 miles per hour) and at higher altitudes(about 29,000 feet, versus 6,500 feet) than propeller-driven drones.
As a result, Ukraine’s propeller-based interceptor drones (maximum speed 280 miles per hour) have become much less effective at intercepting their targets. The previous tactic of chasing a target from behind is obsolete. Their only remaining viable interception tactic is a head-on approach, which significantly reduces the hit rate of interceptor drones. The entire concept of low-cost, counter-drone defense based on propeller-driven systems no longer looks as promising as it did two to three years ago.
Meanwhile, Iranian engineers have also designed a counter-drone solution of their own: the so-called 358 missile, reportedly priced at around $90,000 per unit. The 358 missile can efficiently intercept a broad class of aerial threats, including Shahed-type systems as well as more advanced platforms such as the MQ-9 Reaper, Wing Loong II, the AH-64 Apache, and others. Unlike Western counter-drone efforts, the Iranian approach seems both more forward-looking and more flexible and durable in practice.
Western defense establishments, however, perhaps facing industry pressure or falling prey to narratives about drone dominance, appear to be doubling down on propeller-based unmanned aerial systems for both offensive and counter-drone operations, despite physical ceilings that adversaries can exploit and outmaneuver.
If NATO’s adversaries achieve meaningful progress in scaling production of turbojet drones and solid-fuel missiles, thus driving down their per-unit cost — while laser technologies mature into a credible defense against the full spectrum of aerial threats — propeller drones will no longer be the versatile, game-changing platform they ar