Drones, Civilians and Law in North Africa and the Sahel
AI Analysis
This report details the legal and ethical concerns surrounding drone strikes in North Africa and the Sahel, specifically focusing on 'dynamic strikes' – attacks on unidentified targets based solely on behavioral analysis from the drone itself, without independent verification. It argues that this practice, enabled by the 'hunter-killer' drone model and lack of ground control, is a primary driver of civilian casualties and violates existing International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The report advocates for greater transparency in targeting doctrines and stricter arms transfer controls.
Key Takeaways
- The core issue is 'dynamic strikes' on unidentified targets without independent verification, particularly in areas with no ground presence.
- Existing IHL (Article 57 of Additional Protocol I) already prohibits such strikes, but lacks enforcement mechanisms.
- The 'hunter-killer' drone model – combining surveillance and strike capabilities on a single platform – increases the temptation for unverified attacks.
- The report identifies key drone supplier states: Israel, Turkey, UAE, Russia, France, and the United States, and calls for conditional arms transfers based on IHL compliance.
- Greater transparency in national targeting doctrines and increased regional oversight of arms transfers are proposed solutions to reduce civilian harm.
Why It Matters
This analysis highlights a critical gap in the legal framework governing drone warfare, particularly in regions with limited state control. Addressing this gap is crucial for mitigating civilian casualties and establishing accountability for drone strikes, potentially impacting military doctrine and arms sales policies globally. The call for transparency could significantly increase scrutiny of drone operations and potentially constrain their use.
Drones, Civilians and Law in North Africa and the Sahel - Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
Drones, Civilians and Law in North Africa and the Sahel: The “Hunter-Killer” Mode as a Structural Driver of Civilian Casualties
The admission came from a US Air Force general quoted by Gregoire Chamayou in his book A Theory of the Drone: “We’ve moved from using UAVs primarily in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions before Operation Iraqi Freedom, to a true hunter-killer role with the Reaper (MQ-9).”(1) This transition, carried out by the American military in the mid-2000s, captures the central problem this article seeks to analyze. When a single platform both surveys and strikes, when the eye and the weapon become one, the temptation to strike what one sees without verifying its nature through other means becomes structural. Moreover, when this fusion occurs in zones where the operator has no ground presence, no human agent on the terrain capable of confirming or refuting an identification, the result is predictable : innocent civilians die.
But the problem is not merely technical. Chamayou identifies a deeper political logic at work: “the real advantage of unmanned aerial systems is that they allow you to project power without projecting vulnerability.”(2) This asymmetry is not incidental to drone warfare in the Sahel and North Africa. It is its organizing principle. The populations exposed to these strikes are nomadic herders in the Saharan desert, artisanal gold miners on remote tracks, villagers in the Malian interior. They share a common characteristic that has nothing to do with their legal status: they live in spaces where no state is able or willing to protect them, and where no institution exists to record what happens to them. The drone operates where accountability ends.
On January 3, 2021, in Bounti, in central Mali, drones from Barkhane operation struck a wedding gathering. Twenty-two people died, including sixteen civilians according to the MINUSMA investigation. Five presumed members of the Katiba Serma (a terrorist faction of the armed group JNIM) were present among approximately one hundred villagers. France had no ground forces in the Douentza cercle that day. The identification rested on aerial images and algorithmic analysis of behaviors observed from the sky. That is not sufficient. IHL has said exactly this since 1977, but without an enforcement mechanism that makes it effective for armies that choose to ignore it.
This article builds on this observation to defend a precise hypothesis: across the four theaters of the Sahelo-Maghrebian arc studied here, the combination of hunter-killer mode and the absence of ground control constitutes the principal structural driver of documented civilian casualties. The legal solution that flows from this hypothesis is not new general rules on drones, but a specific and binding norm: the prohibition of dynamic strikes on unknown targets identified behaviorally from the strike platfor