Russia Analytical Report, March 23–30, 2026 | Russia Matters

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Russia Analytical Report, March 23–30, 2026

4 Ideas to Explore

1. Thomas Graham writes in CFR that the Iran war has “at least temporarily alleviated a severe budget crisis” for Moscow. With the Strait of Hormuz closed and U.S. sanctions partly eased, “oil prices have surged” and “Russia’s oil revenue doubled during the first three weeks of the conflict,” he writes. In addition, Trump’s focus on Iran “inevitably distracts its [U.S.] attention from Ukraine,” and “the rapid depletion of munitions, especially for air defensive systems,” limits U.S. assistance to Ukraine, Graham observes in a commentary entitled “The Iran War Is a Boon for Russia. Putin Should Still Worry.” At the same time, Russia’s image as a great power has already suffered because America’s Iran and Venezuela operations “underscore Russia’s military inadequacies” and show “how little support it can provide its allies,” according to Graham.
2. Thomas Grove reminds us that Russia is stepping up its support for Iran, “providing satellite imagery and drone technology to help Iran target U.S. forces” and giving “tactical guidance on how many drones should be used in strikes and from which altitudes.” Russia is doing so in an effort “to salvage what’s left of its shrinking web of partnerships.” Russia sees the survival of the Iranian regime as key to maintaining “a toehold in the Middle East,” according to Grove. This WSJ journalist cites Kremlin-connected nationalist philosopher Alexander Dugin as warning that without a harder line by Moscow against Washington, “one by one, our partners will simply fall.”
3. In “How Russia Weaponized the Cold Ukrainian Winter,” C.J. Chivers reminds us in NYT how missile and drone barrages shattered Kyiv’s energy grid, severing power and heat to hundreds of thousands. Ukrainian energy expert Oleksandr Kharchenko calls it a premeditated assault on the city’s “life‑support system,” warning that even in a best‑case scenario, only 30–40% of electrical capacity can be restored before next winter and that full recovery may take five years, according to Chivers.
4. In a commentary for War on the Rocks, Mariya Omelicheva challenges the idea that Vladimir Putin “cannot afford to lose” in Ukraine. “History offers little support for the proposition that military failure—or victory—alone topples authoritarian regimes,” she argues. U.S. “strategy should therefore proceed from the premise of authoritarian durability,” she writes. Omelicheva argues that “Putin operates within a system built to absorb significant costs.” “As long as revenue flows remain sufficient, elites lack secure exit options, the coercive core stays cohesive and society remains politically fragmented, he retains greater latitude to negotiate than the ‘trapped’ narrative suggests,” according to Omelicheva.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda